The paper investigates the political and economic factors which affect the government's decision to allow foreign investors to purchase domestic equity securities. The levels of industrialization and financial development, the quality of investor protection, and the level of the government's involvement in the economy are closely associated with the stock market liberalization decision. Additionally, the amount of foreign financial aid received by the governments in the emerging market countries is significantly and positively related to the probability of a stock market liberalization. The latter result contributes to the debate about the effectiveness of foreign aid by illustrating that foreign financial aid may indirectly affect economic growth through its influence on the government's decision to liberalize the national equity markets.
Introduction
Over the past two decades a great number of emerging market and developing countries have opened their equity markets to foreign investors in a process known as stock market liberalization.
Numerous academic studies document that stock market liberalizations improve risk sharing and substantially reduce the cost of capital (Bekaert and Harvey (2000) , Bekaert et al. (2006 ), Blair Henry (2000a ), Blair Henry (2003 , Chari and Blair Henry (2004) ), increase aggregate investment (Blair Henry (2000b) ), and promote economic growth (Bekaert et al. (2005) , Moshirian (2008) ).
Recent studies further document that stock market liberalizations reduce agency costs and aggregate stock-return volatility in emerging markets (Ghosh et al. (2008) , Umutlu et al. (2010) In this paper we use an extensive list of countries for which we can identify whether a stock market liberalization occurred and the date of such event, and employ a probit model and a dura-tion model to analyze the factors which affect the liberalization decision. Our results suggest that both political and economic factors influence the government's decision to liberalize the national stock markets. Among the economic factors, the level of financial development, the structure of the economy, the quality of investor protection, and the level of the government's involvement in the economy are significantly related to the likelihood of stock market liberalization. The significant political factors include the government's political orientation and the influence of foreign governments and agencies through the allocation of foreign financial aid.
Our finding that the amount of foreign financial aid received by the governments in the emerging market and developing countries is significantly and positively related to the probability of a stock market liberalization contributes to the long-standing debate about the effectiveness of foreign aid. Specifically, economists have long sought to demonstrate that foreign financial aid promotes economic growth. Many of the empirical studies, however, fail to identify a robust positive effect of foreign financial aid on economic growth (Easterly (2003) , Easterly et al. (2004) , Rajan and Subramanian (2008) ). Easterly et al. (2004) state the need for further research which ". . . will continue to explore pressing macroeconomic and microeconomic questions surrounding foreign aid, such as whether aid can foment reforms in policies and institutions that in turn foster economic growth. . . "(p.780). Our paper provides some evidence in this direction. We find that foreign financial aid is positively related to the likelihood of a stock market liberalization, which in turn promotes economic growth.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data and identifies the political and economic factors that can potentially influence the likelihood of a stock market liberalization. Section 3 describes the methodology employed in the analysis of the stock market liberalization decision. Section 4 presents the empirical findings. Section 5 tests the robustness of the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
Data

Dating the stock market liberalizations
The objective of the paper is to examine the political and economic factors which affect the government's decision to liberalize the domestic equity markets. We use the official stock market liberalization dates provided by Bekaert et al. (2005) . 2 These dates correspond to the dates of formal regulatory change after which foreign investors officially have the opportunity to invest in domestic equity securities. Bekaert et al. (2005) examine 95 countries out of which 17 liberalized their equity markets before 1980. 3 Another 6 countries, out of the remaining 78 nations, are considered economically developed (Greece, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, and Spain), which leaves 72 emerging market and developing countries. We are able to collect data on the majority of the explanatory variables used in the subsequent analysis for 70 out of the 72 countries.
Therefore, our final sample consists of 70 emerging market and developing countries out of which 36 liberalized their stock markets in the period from 1980 to 2000. Our indicator variable for the official stock market liberalization takes the value of one on and after the year of the stock market 2 Most of the dates are based on Bekaert and Harvey's (2002) chronology of important financial, economic and political events in emerging markets.
3 These 17 countries are primarily developed nations and include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. 4 liberalization, and zero otherwise.
There are alternative methods to date the equity market liberalizations. For example, the "First Sign" measure is based on the earliest of three possible events: the launching of a country fund, the announcement of an American Depository Receipt (ADR) or the official equity market liberalization. Additionally, Edison and Warnock (2003) propose a continuous measure of equity market liberalizations that reflects the availability of domestic equity securities to foreign investors. Since the objective of our study is to examine factors that influence the government's decision to liberalize the national stock markets, we employ the official stock market liberalization dates which are directly related to regulatory changes.
Factors affecting the likelihood of a stock market liberalization
In this section, we present and discuss the economic and political factors which can potentially influence the government's decision to liberalize the domestic equity markets. The majority of the data is from the World Bank Databases and from the OECD's website. Table 1 
Economic development
The success of the equity market liberalizations largely depends on the foreign investors' demand for shares of companies in the liberalizing countries. Therefore, the countries with higher levels of economic development may be more likely to liberalize their equity markets, since they are also more likely to attract foreign investors. Alternatively, poorer countries which depend more on foreign capital may be less opposed to foreign ownership and, therefore, more likely to liberalize their equity markets. We use gross national income per capital (GNI per capita) as proxy for the level of economic development.
Financial development
The countries that have better developed financial markets are more likely to have the institutions necessary to support a market economy, and are more likely to attract foreign investors following the liberalization of their stock markets. We proxy for the development of the banking sector with PRIVATE CREDIT, which equals the financial intermediary credits to the private sector divided by the gross domestic product. We follow Boehmer et al. (2005) , Megginson et al. (2004), and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and measure stock market development with TURNOVER, which equals the ratio of annual equity value-traded to market capitalization.
Structure of the economy
We expect that the likelihood of stock market liberalization will be lower in the countries where agriculture constitutes the majority of economic activity and higher in the more industrialized countries, which have larger capital needs. Our proxies for the structure of the economy are AGRICULTURE and INDUSTRY. AGRICULTURE equals the share of economic value added in forestry, hunting, fishing, and cultivation of crops and livestock production as a percentage of gross domestic product. INDUSTRY equals the share of economic value added in mining, manufactur-6 ing, construction, electricity generation, and water and gas production as a percentage of gross domestic product.
Business environment
The level of investor protection affects the willingness of foreign investors to purchase domestic equity securities. We expect that the countries that have institutions protecting the rights of the minority shareholders are more likely to benefit from the stock market liberalizations, and therefore, are more likely to liberalize their equity markets. Our proxy for the level of investor protection and, more broadly, for the presence of institutions supporting financial development is the common-law/civil-law dummy variable proposed by La Porta et al. (1998) . These authors document that the countries with common law legal origin have stronger legal protection of investor rights than the countries with civil law legal origin.
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Countries that are more integrated into the global economy, by being open to trade and capital flows, might be more likely to liberalize their equity markets. 5 However, openness to trade may also be associated with large economic rents for incumbent firms that oppose the liberalization of the domestic equity markets, because the removal of barriers to foreign equity ownership promotes financial development and spurs competition. 6 The direction of the relationship between trade openness and stock market liberalization is ambiguous and is left as an empirical question. Our 4 Beck et al. (2003) find that legal origin matters for financial development because the legal traditions differ in their ability to adapt efficiently to evolving economic conditions. 5 The 2002 World Development Report, published by the World Bank, states that: "Openness to trade and the exchange of ideas within countries and between countries has served as a catalyst for institutional change throughout history"(p.9).
6 See Rajan and Zingales (2003) for a thorough discussion of this topic.
7
proxy for openness to trade is TRADE OPENNESS, which equals the sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by gross domestic product. The proxy for openness to foreign capital is FDI, which equals net foreign direct investment divided by gross domestic product.
Government in the economy
Governments which are less market oriented and instead rely on the political process to allocate resources and goods and services are less likely to support financial development in general, and may oppose the liberalization of the domestic equity markets. Additionally, government officials may be reluctant to remove the barriers to foreign equity ownership in order to preserve the rents that they extract from the government's involvement in the economy. This argument is supported by Djankov et al. (2002) who suggest that government regulation of economic activity benefits politicians and bureaucrats. Following La Porta et al. (1999) and La Porta et al. (2002) we proxy for the level of the government's involvement in the economy with GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION, which equals all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services divided by gross domestic product, and the BLACK MARKET PREMIUM index, which reflects the premium one must pay to exchange the domestic currency for dollars in the black market relative to the official exchange rate.
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A government can signal its commitment to market oriented reforms and can foster the development of the domestic equity markets by privatizing its state owned enterprises (Megginson 7 The original version of the BLACK MARKET PREMIUM index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values of the index indicating smaller differences between the official exchange rate and the black market exchange rate. We multiply the original values of the index by -1 in order to interpret the higher values of the index as indicating higher levels of government interference in the economy. 
Political factors Internal
The political orientation of the government can influence the stock market liberalization decision. For example, a nationalist government is more likely to oppose foreign ownership of domestic assets and therefore, may be less likely to liberalize the domestic equity markets. Our proxy for the political orientation of the government is the NATIONALIST indicator variable, which equals one in all the years when the party of the executive is defined as nationalist, and zero otherwise.
We obtain the data from the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions. The majority of the studies on the effects of foreign financial aid on institutional development and government policy find either a negative relationship or an insignificant relationship. There is no evidence that foreign financial aid promotes democracy or market-oriented economic reforms (Knack (2004) , Heckelman and Knack (2005) , and Easterly (2007)), while there is evidence indicating that foreign financial aid worsens the quality of governance (Knack (2001), Rajan and Subramanian (2007) ).
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to directly examine the relationship between foreign financial aid and the liberalization of the equity markets. If aid flows alleviate the need to reform inefficient government policies and institutions, we would expect a negative relationship between foreign financial aid and the likelihood of stock market liberalization. Conversely, if the recipient governments use the aid funds to compensate the politically powerful constituencies that may be adversely affected by the liberalization reforms, or if the "donors" use the foreign financial executive is considered to represent special interest groups if it is classified as nationalist, if words such as "Rural" or "Peasant" appear in the party's name or if farmers are a key party constituency or if the party has a religious affiliation. The results using this measure of the government's political orientation are almost identical to the results using the NATIONALIST variable and are not reported for brevity.
aid to "purchase" the support of the government officials for the liberalization reforms, we would expect a positive relationship between foreign financial aid and the likelihood of stock market liberalization. We measure foreign financial aid with "official development assistance" (ODA), which is available from the OECD's Development Assistance Committee website. Finally, we control for country size in all of our estimations. It is correlated with many of the covariates and can potentially affect the stock market liberalization decision, since the costs of structural reforms may be higher in the larger countries. We use population size as proxy for country size.
Methodology
The objective of the paper is to shed light on the factors that affect the government's decision to liberalize the national stock markets. We begin the analysis with a cross-sectional probit model which allows us to estimate the partial effect of each factor on the likelihood of a stock market liberalization. The dependent variable in the model equals one if the country liberalized its national stock market in the period from 1980 to 2000, and zero otherwise. In order to alleviate the potential endogeneity in the relationship between our explanatory variables and the stock market liberalization indicator we only use data prior to the official equity market liberalization dates. For the countries that did not liberalize their equity markets, we average the explanatory variables over the five years preceding the official liberalization year of their closest geographic neighbor.
10 For 9 ODA aid includes grants and loans with at least 25 percent grant element from multilateral as well as bilateral aid agencies.
10 This approach is used in an earlier version of Bekaert et al. (2005) .
the countries that liberalized their stock markets, we average the explanatory variables over the five years preceding the year of their official equity market liberalization.
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In the second part of the analysis, we estimate a duration model which explores the panel nature of our data. The duration model allows us to investigate the timing of the stock market liberalization decision, and explicitly accounts for the censoring in the data. This latter feature is especially important, because the countries that did not liberalize their equity markets by the end of our sample period may still liberalize afterwards.
Following Cox (1972), we estimate the semiparametric model h(t) = h 0 (t)e X(t)β , where X(t)
is a set of observable (possibly time-varying) covariates, β is a vector of unknown parameters associated with these covariates, and h 0 (t) is the baseline hazard function, which is left unspecified and corresponds to the hazard rate when all the covariates are set to zero. The data for the Cox proportional hazard model is split into seven three-year sub-periods covering the period from 1980 to 2000. 12 The stock market liberalization indicator variable takes the value of one in the threeyear period of the stock market liberalization, and zero otherwise. We use lagged values of the independent variables to reduce the potential endogeneity due to the fact that the equity market liberalizations can affect the majority of our explanatory variables.
Our final estimation technique is a panel probit regression, which allows us to address the potential endogeneity due to the presence of unobservable country level heterogeneity and time effects. We estimate a random effects probit model that incorporates country level heterogeneity by including a specific unobservable country effect in the error term. 13 We control for the unobservable time effects by including time fixed effects. The data for the panel probit model is the same as the data used in the Cox proportional hazard model. 14 4. Results Tables 2 and 3 [Insert Tables 2 -3 here] 13 An important restriction of the random effects model is that the unobservable country effect is assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
14 We have a balanced panel with seven three-year periods for each of the 70 countries. Table 4 Our hypothesis about the government's role in the economy suggests that the more interventionist governments are less likely to remove the barriers to foreign equity ownership. The univariate tests show that GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION is almost identical in the liberalized and nonliberalized countries, but the BLACK MARKET PREMIUM index is higher in the non-liberalized countries. Therefore, the size of the government is roughly the same in the two groups, but the governments in the non-liberalized countries tend to favor more interventionist policies.
[Insert Tables 4 -5 here]
The political factors that can potentially influence the government's decision to liberalize the domestic stock markets include the government's political orientation and the influence of foreign governments and international financial institutions through the allocation of foreign financial aid.
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The evidence in Table 4 suggests that the countries which liberalize their stock markets are less likely to have a nationalist government (the difference, however, is not statistically significant), and receive significantly more foreign financial aid than the countries which do not liberalize their stock markets.
The univariate analysis provides an insightful description of the data, but does not allow us to disentangle the relative importance of each factor and is subject to obvious reverse causality issues.
In the next section, we estimate a cross-sectional probit model, which partially addresses the above concerns. Table 6 presents the results from the following cross-sectional probit model:
Cross-sectional probit model
β 4 trade openness + β 5 FDI + β 6 black market premium index+ β 7 government consumption + β 8 agriculture + β 9 private credit+ β 10 market turnover + β 11 all donors financial aid)
[Insert Table 6 here]
The results support some of our predictions about the effects of the economic variables on the likelihood of a stock markets liberalization. The level of financial development, as measured by the equity turnover ratio, is positively and significantly related to the probability of a stock market liberalization. Regarding the structure of the economy, the negative and significant coefficient on AGRICULTURE suggests that the likelihood of a stock market liberalization is lower 15 in the countries where agriculture constitutes the majority of economic activity. The parameter estimates for the coefficients of the proxies for the level of investor protection and for the openness to foreign capital are also positive and significant. Our hypothesis about the effect of government involvement in the economy predicts that the bigger and more interventionist governments are less likely to remove the barriers to foreign equity ownership. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION and the BLACK MARKET PREMIUM index are both negatively related to the probability of a stock market liberalization.
Regarding the political variables, the results in Table 6 Foreign financial aid is often measured in the prior literature as a percentage of gross national income or on a per capita basis. We, however, use a measure of foreign financial aid that equals the total official development assistance received by the national governments in the recipient countries, and include gross national income per capita (GNI per capita) and population size as separate regressors. This measure is more appropriate for our analysis, because we are investigating the factors that can potentially influence the government's decision to liberalize the domestic equity markets. The actual dollar amount of the foreign financial aid is a better indicator of the influence of the donors on the policies of the domestic governments (potentially a small group of government officials), because as Boone (1996) demonstrates, foreign financial aid mostly benefits local political elites. Furthermore, Kuziemko and Werker (2006) use a similar measure of foreign financial aid to show that foreign aid is used to bribe the rotating members on the U.N. Security Council.
The probit model in Table 6 is estimated in a static setting, which allows us to investigate the differences in the characteristics between the countries that liberalized their stock markets and those that did not. This model alleviates the reverse causality issues since we average the explanatory variables over the five years preceding the official liberalization year, but is sensitive to the choice of dates for the non-liberalizing countries and does not explore the panel nature of our data.
15 15 Another limitation of the cross-sectional probit model is that we cannot test the effects of FIRST PRIVATIZA-TION, FIRST SIP, and NATIONALIST on the likelihood of a stock market liberalization. The size of our sample renders the estimation of such a highly parameterized model infeasible. We return to the analysis of these variables in the Cox regressions and in the panel probit model.
Cox proportional hazard model
In this section, we model the duration of the time period until a country's stock market liberalization, given the observable covariates. The model treats all the countries that did not liberalize their equity markets during our sample period as right censored. Tables 7 and 8 present the results from five different specifications of the Cox proportional hazard model. For ease of interpretation we report hazard ratios instead of coefficients. These ratios measure how much the hazard of liberalization (i.e. the instantaneous risk of liberalization) increases for a unit change in the respective covariate. A hazard ratio greater than one indicates that the covariate, ceteris paribus, increases the probability of a stock market liberalization, while a hazard ratio lower than one indicates that the covariate decreases the probability of a stock market liberalization.
[Insert Tables 7-8 here] Model 1 in Table 7 is almost identical to the specification in the cross-sectional probit model. There are, however, a number of differences between the results from the probit model and the hazard model. The level of economic development and the size of the country are negatively and significantly related to the hazard of liberalization, and the openness to foreign capital is no longer significant. The negative effect of GNI per capita on the hazard of liberalization supports the view that the poorer countries, which lack investment capital, are less opposed to foreign equity ownership and therefore, are more likely to liberalize their equity markets. The negative effect of POPULATION is consistent with the hypothesis that the costs of structural reforms are higher in the larger countries.
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To interpret the economic significance of the covariates we examine the effect of various changes in the covariates on the hazard of liberalization.
17 For example, the hazard ratio associated with GNI per capita is 0.9996. Therefore, a $100 increase in GNI per capita reduces the probability of a stock market liberalization by approximately 4 percent. Similarly, a 10 million increase in population reduces the probability of a stock market liberalization by approximately 7 percent. The hazard ratio associated with the common law indicator is 6.78. Thus, a unit change (i.e. moving from a civil law country to a common law country) increases the probability of equity market liberalization almost sevenfold. Regarding the BLACK MARKET PREMIUM index, a unit increase in the index translates into a 25 percent reduction in the hazard of liberalization.
Similarly, a one percent increase in GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION decreases the hazard of 16 When comparing the results from the Cox proportional hazard model to the results from the cross-sectional probit model, it is important to note that the duration model is more appropriate for analyzing the stock market liberalization decision and is less subject to bias.
17 All the covariates are lagged three-year averages of the data. Therefore, each hazard ratio measures how much the hazard of liberalization (in the next three-year period) increases for a unit change in the three-year average of the respective covariate.
liberalization by approximately 20 percent. The hazard ratios associated with the variables which proxy for the structure of the economy AGRICULTURE and INDUSTRY are 0.9293 and 1.0922
respectively. This implies that a one percent increase in AGRICULTURE (INDUSTRY) decreases (increases) the probability of a stock market liberalization by 7 (9) percent. Regarding the proxies for the level of financial development, a 10 percent increase in PRIVATE CREDIT (MARKET TURNOVER) increases the hazard of equity market liberalization by approximately 22 percent (89 percent). Finally, the hazard ratio associated with our measure of foreign financial aid is 1.001.
Therefore, a $100 million increase in foreign financial aid increases the probability of a stock market liberalization by approximately 10 percent.
Model 2 in Table 7 tests the effect of the government's political orientation on the likelihood of a stock market liberalization. The NATIONALIST indicator variable is negatively related to the probability of a stock market liberalization (i.e. its hazard ratio is lower than one), which is consistent with our hypothesis that a nationalist government is more likely to oppose the liberalization of the domestic equity markets. The variable, however, is only marginally significant (p-value of 0.12). Table 8 Table 7 to including regional dummies. 18 The results remain qualitatively the same. Tables 9 and 10 further investigate the effect of foreign financial aid on the probability of a stock market liberalization by splitting the foreign aid into two categories: bilateral versus multilateral aid. Prior literature suggests that bilateral aid has a large positive effect on government consumption while multilateral aid does not (Burnside and Dollar (2000)). 19 In the less transparent environments of the emerging market countries the increases in government consumption associated with the increases in foreign financial aid can potentially be used by the governments to compensate the politically-powerful groups, which might be adversely affected by the equity market liberalization reforms. Additionally, the increases in government consumption, financed with the foreign financial aid, might be correlated with increases in the private consumption of the government officials (i.e., foreign financial aid can be used to "purchase" the support of the government officials for the liberalization reforms). Both of these arguments suggest that we should find a stronger relationship between bilateral aid and the likelihood of stock market liberalization than between multilateral aid and the likelihood of liberalization. The evidence from model 1 in Table 9 supports this hypothesis. The effect of bilateral aid on the hazard of liberalization is positive and significant, while the effect of multilateral aid on the hazard of liberalization is not statistically significant. Therefore, the bilateral aid flows appear to drive the relationship between foreign financial aid and the probability of stock market liberalization.
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[Insert Tables 9 -10 here] 19 This can be attributed to the fact that multilateral aid tends to be more project oriented. 20 In unreported regressions, we split the bilateral aid into aid from the United States, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom. Aid from Japan is consistently positively and significantly related to the probability of a stock market liberalization. US aid is also significant in several specifications.
An important characteristic of foreign financial aid is "aid conditionality". International financial institutions often condition the release of foreign financial aid on the implementation of structural reforms by the recipient governments. This approach of aid allocation suggests that foreign financial aid increases after the implementation of the reforms. Therefore, "aid conditionality" does not explain the results in our study, since we document a positive and significant relationship between foreign financial aid and the subsequent probability of a stock market liberalization. Furthermore, "aid conditionality" is primarily associated with multilateral aid, while our results are mainly driven by the bilateral aid flows.
Model 2 in Table 9 Tables 11 and 12 report the estimates from a panel probit model, which allows us to explicitly account for some of the unobservable country and time effects. To control for these sources of potential endogeneity we estimate random effects regressions with time fixed effects. The majority 21 The hazard ratios for the regional dummies are not reported in the table for brevity.
Panel probit model
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of the panel probit results are consistent with the findings from the Cox regressions, which attests to the robustness of our results. Model 1 in Table 11 is identical to model 1 in Table 7 with the exception that the former includes random effects and time fixed effects. The main distinction is that the proxies for the level of economic development and for country size are no longer significant. In model 2, we include the NATIONALIST dummy variable and find that it has a significant negative effect on the probability of stock market liberalization. Specification 3 in Table 12 shows that the FIRST SIP indicator variable has a positive and significant effect on the probability of stock market In model 4 of Table 12 we examine the robustness of the panel probit results to including regional dummy variables. 23 The majority of the results remain qualitatively the same. Finally, in 22 We also estimate the regression with the FIRST PRIVATIZATION indicator variable and obtain similar results, but do not report them for brevity. 23 The reported coefficients are for the regression that includes only the dummy variable for countries of the Middle East and North Africa. We cannot include all the regional dummy variables simultaneously, because the maximization Tables 13 and 14 we reestimate all the regressions from Tables 11 and 12 
Robustness
In this section, we perform a number of tests to confirm the robustness of our main findings. Table 5 show that there are several potential outliers in the data. The maximum value for population, for example, is 1,015 million people. This value corresponds to the population of India, which is in the sample of liberalized countries. After dropping India from the sample, the coefficient on population loses significance in the Cox proportional hazard model, but the other findings remain qualitatively the same. Another source of potential outliers is GOV-ERNMENT CONSUMPTION, which has extremely high values for Kuwait (76.22 percent). All of our results, including the results on GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION, are robust to excluding Kuwait from the sample. Table 4 illustrates that there are important differences between the countries that liberalized their equity markets during our sample period and those that did not. Some observers may argue that these two groups of countries are so fundamentally different that they should not be combined algorithm exhibits convergence problems with too many binary variables. We do, however, estimate the model by including the regional dummies sequentially and obtain qualitatively similar results. 24 These results are not reported, but are available upon request.
The descriptive statistics in
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together. We address this concern by reestimating the duration models from Table 7 using only the subset of liberalized counties. The results presented in Table 15 support the majority of our previous findings. Specifically, the more industrialized countries which provide better investor protection, have less interventionist and less nationalistic governments, and receive more foreign financial aid are likely to liberalize their equity markets faster.
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One of the most interesting results in the paper is the positive relationship between foreign financial aid and the likelihood of stock market liberalization. The most significant criticism against this finding arises from the potential endogeneity of foreign financial aid. We address this issue by using an instrumental variables approach within the cross-sectional probit model. A valid instrumental variable would be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable, but uncorrelated with the error term (ε). Therefore, we need to identify a variable which can indirectly affect the government's decision to liberalize the domestic equity markets through the foreign financial aid channel (and the other determinants of the liberalization decision), but cannot have an independent effect on the regressand. One variable that potentially fits this description is the country's colonial background. Alesina and Dollar (2000) as the country's legal origin), but does not have an independent effect on the dependant variable. Table 16 illustrates the results from a cross-sectional instrumental variable (IV) probit estimation and from a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression model, where the instrumented variable is "All donors financial aid" and the instruments are dummy variables for British, French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonial past. The coefficient on the instrumented foreign financial aid variable is 0.0058 in the IV probit model, which is similar to the 0.0056 that we obtain in the probit model in Table 6 , and is significant at the one percent level. The coefficient on the instrumented foreign financial aid variable is positive and significant in the 2SLS model as well. These results alleviate the endogeneity concerns and reinforces our finding that foreign financial aid significantly influences the government's decision to liberalize the domestic equity markets.
[Insert Table 16 here] Finally, to lessen the effect of outliers, we winsorize the foreign financial aid variable at the five percent level and drop Israel and Egypt from the sample, because they are the largest recipients of aid from the United States, which is also the largest donor of foreign financial aid. The results are robust to both of these alternative specifications.
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Conclusion
In this paper we analyze some of the factors that can potentially influence the government's decision to allow foreign investors to purchase domestic equity securities. We document that both political and economic factors affect the stock market liberalization decision. Specifically, the more industrialized countries, which have higher levels of financial development, provide better legal protection of minority shareholder rights and have less interventionist governments are more likely to liberalize their equity markets. Regarding the political factors, nationalist governments are less likely to allow foreign investors to purchase domestic equity securities, whereas governments that receive more foreign financial aid, especially bilateral aid, are more likely to liberalize their equity markets. The exact channels through which foreign financial aid influences the domestic government's decision to liberalize their national stock markets are unclear. One possible interpretation is that the recipient governments use the foreign financial aid to compensate the politically powerful groups that would otherwise oppose the liberalization of the stock markets, or that the "donors" use the foreign financial aid to "purchase" the support of the government officials for the liberalization reforms.
The positive effect of foreign financial aid on the probability of a stock market liberalization may indicate the presence of an indirect link between foreign financial aid and economic growth.
Specifically, foreign financial aid increases the likelihood of a stock market liberalization, which in turn promotes economic growth.
27 Tables   Table 1  Variable a-statistically significant at 1% level, b -statistically significant at 5% level, c -statistically significant at 10% level.
The table presents summary statistics for the period from 1980 to 2000, and the results from a two-sample mean comparison test for the countries that liberalized their stock markets and those that did not. The variables Trade openness, Foreign direct investment, Government consumption, Agriculture, Industry, and Private credit are all expressed as fractions of gross domestic product. Market turnover is expressed as a fraction of total market capitalization. GNI per capita is measured in constant US dollars. Population is measured in millions, and All donors financial aid, DAC bilateral financial aid, and Multilateral financial aid are expressed in millions of constant US dollars. The table presents summary statistics for all the countries in our sample for the period from 1980 to 2000. The variables Trade openness, Foreign direct investment, Government consumption, Agriculture, Industry, and Private credit are all expressed as fractions of gross domestic product. Market turnover is expressed as a fraction of total market capitalization. GNI per capita is measured in constant US dollars. Population is measured in millions, and All donors financial aid, DAC bilateral financial aid, and Multilateral financial aid are expressed in millions of constant US dollars. a-statistically significant at 1% level, b -statistically significant at 5% level, c -statistically significant at 10% level.
The dependent variable in the probit model takes the value of one if the country liberalized its national stock market in the period from 1980 to 2000, and zero otherwise. For the countries that liberalized their national stock markets, the explanatory variables are averaged over the five years preceding the liberalization year. For the countries that did not liberalize their equity markets, the explanatory variables are averaged over the five years preceding the liberalization year of their closest geographic neighbor. The table reports the coefficients and Quasi-Maximum Likelihood adjusted standard errors (in parenthesis below), and the associated partial effects. a-statistically significant at 1% level, b -statistically significant at 5% level, c -statistically significant at 10% level.
The table presents the results from the duration model estimated using the data from seven three-year sub-periods covering the period from 1980 to 2000. We model the duration between a country's entry in our sample and its official equity market liberalization. The official equity market liberalization indicator variable takes the value of one in and after the three-year period of the stock market liberalization, and zero otherwise. The countries that did not liberalize their equity markets in the period from 1980 to 2000 are treated as right-censored. The explanatory variables are lagged three-year averages of the data. The table reports hazard ratios and the associated standard errors (in parenthesis below). a-statistically significant at 1% level, b -statistically significant at 5% level, c -statistically significant at 10% level.
The table presents the results from the duration model estimated using the data from seven three-year sub-periods covering the period from 1980 to 2000. We model the duration between a country's entry in our sample and its official equity market liberalization. The official equity market liberalization indicator variable takes the value of one in and after the three-year period of the stock market liberalization, and zero otherwise. The countries that did not liberalize their equity markets in the period from 1980 to 2000 are treated as right-censored. The explanatory variables are lagged three-year averages of the data. Model 5 includes regional indicators. The table reports hazard ratios and the associated standard errors (in parenthesis below). a-statistically significant at 1% level, b -statistically significant at 5% level, c -statistically significant at 10% level.
The table presents the results from the duration model estimated using the data from seven three-year sub-periods covering the period from 1980 to 2000. We model the duration between a country's entry in our sample and its official equity market liberalization. The countries that did not liberalize their equity markets in the period from 1980 to 2000 are treated as right-censored.The explanatory variables are lagged three-year averages of the data. Model 5 includes regional indicators. The table reports hazard ratios and the associated standard errors (in parenthesis below). a-statistically significant at 1% level, b -statistically significant at 5% level, c -statistically significant at 10% level.
The table presents the results from the maximum likelihood estimation of the panel probit model. The data is split into seven three-year sub-periods covering the period from 1980 to 2000. The dependent variable takes the value of one in and after the three-year period of the stock market liberalization, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are lagged three-year averages of the data. All specifications include random effects and time fixed effects. The table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis below), as well as the associated partial effects. a-statistically significant at 1% level, b -statistically significant at 5% level, c -statistically significant at 10% level.
The table presents the results from the maximum likelihood estimation of the panel probit model. The data is split into seven three-year sub-periods covering the period from 1980 to 2000. The dependent variable takes the value of one in and after the three-year period of the stock market liberalization, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are lagged three-year averages of the data. All specifications include random effects and time fixed effects. Model 4 includes regional indicators. The table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis below), as well as the associated partial effects. a-statistically significant at 1% level, b -statistically significant at 5% level, c -statistically significant at 10% level.
The table presents the results from the duration model estimated using the data from seven three-year sub-periods covering the period from 1980 to 2000. We model the duration between a country's entry in our sample and its official equity market liberalization. The official equity market liberalization indicator variable takes the value of one in and after the three-year period of the stock market liberalization, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are lagged three-year averages of the data. The table reports hazard ratios and the associated standard errors (in parenthesis below). a-statistically significant at 1% level, b -statistically significant at 5% level, c -statistically significant at 10% level.
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the country liberalized its national stock market in the period from 1980 to 2000, and zero otherwise. The instrumented variable is "All donors financial aid" and the instruments are dummy variables for British, French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonial past. For the countries that liberalized their national stock markets, the explanatory variables are averaged over the five years preceding the liberalization year. For the countries that did not liberalize their equity markets, the explanatory variables are averaged over the five years preceding the liberalization year of their closest geographic neighbor. The table reports Quasi-Maximum Likelihood adjusted standard errors for the IV probit model and robust standard errors for the 2SLS model.
